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The paper shows that there is a substantial degree of heterogeneity in the ability of Fed watchers 
to forecast US monetary policy decisions. Based on a novel database for 268 professional 
forecasters since 1999, the average forecast error of FOMC decisions varies 5 to 10 basis points 
between the best and worstperformers across the sample. This heterogeneity is found to be 
related to both the skills of analysts – such as their educational and employment backgrounds – 
and to geography. In particular, forecasters located in regions which experience more 
idiosyncratic economic conditions perform worse in anticipating monetary policy. This evidence 
is indicative that limited attention and heterogeneous priors are present even for anticipating 
important events such as monetary policy decisions. Moreover, the paper shows that such 
heterogeneity is economically important as it leads to greater financial market volatility after 
FOMC meetings. Finally, policy-makers are not impotent in influencing such heterogeneity as 
Fed communication is found to affect forecast accuracy significantly.  
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21.  Introduction  
 
Over the last two decades, a major evolution has taken place in the world of central banking 
towards a transparent conduct of monetary policy and away from a monetary policy that had 
often largely surprised the public. In light of this development, central banks have repeatedly 
stressed the importance of predictability of their decisions, which has indeed improved 
remarkably over time (e.g., Poole, Rasche and Thornton 2002; Lange, Sack and Whitesell 2003).  
 
While much of the empirical work has focused on predictability based on the financial market 
consensus (Kuttner 2001, Hamilton 2007, Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson 2007), others have 
documented the role of disagreement and heterogeneity among agents in forecasting monetary 
policy (Bauer, Eisenbeis, Waggoner and Zha 2006, Swanson 2006). The latter papers suggest that 
the increasingly transparent monetary policy of the Federal Reserve has not only led to a better 
prediction by financial markets in general, but is also reflected in more synchronized forecasts of 
monetary policy decision. Nonetheless, these papers also document that a remarkable degree of 
disagreement among forecasters about future central bank actions seems to persist. 
 
The literature suggests a number of factors that may be responsible for the disagreement among 
economic forecasters. Hong and Stein (2007), surveying the discussion on financial market 
forecasting, stress asymmetries in information availability and information processing. An 
example relating to information availability is the notion of “gradual information flow”, where 
the arrival of information is staggered across agents. Examples relating to information processing 
include limited attention (where agents neglect or overweight information because of limits in 
their information processing capabilities) and heterogeneous prior beliefs (where agents receive 
the same information, yet interpret it differently).1 Differences in information processing and 
heterogeneous beliefs seem of particular importance in the area of monetary policy, where, as a 
rule, the relevant macroeconomic information governing central bank decisions, as well as all 
relevant central bank communication is available to all forecasters. 
 
The present paper focuses on the heterogeneity among forecasters of monetary policy decisions 
by the U.S. Federal Reserve, and its determinants. The paper is motivated by the fact, as we will 
show, that such heterogeneity is remarkably high, having substantial economic costs. To 
understand this heterogeneity, we concentrate on forecaster asymmetries in information 
processing related to skill differences and geography. Given an abundance of potentially relevant 
data, a major challenge in forecasting monetary policy decisions is to make an appropriate 
selection of information and apply proper weights. Limited attention as well as heterogeneous 
priors can therefore easily generate disagreement. Both mechanisms suggest that skills have an 
important role to play, as better skilled forecasters devote the appropriate attention to the relevant 
signals, or have priors which more closely reflect the actual FOMC behavior.  
 
Another important implication is that geographical location matters. This is because local 
information is salient, which, in the presence of limited attention might bias information 
processing and distract forecasters’ attention from other signals. In addition, geographical 
location could influence priors, for instance, because the salience of local information shapes the 
                                                 
1 Hong, Stein and Yu (2007) develop a model where financial market participants simplify a forecasting 
problem by selecting a small subset of the available data, and provide empirical support for the model’s 
predictions. Further evidence in favor of limited attention of investors is provided, e.g., in Hirshleifer and 
Teoh (2003) and Peng and Xiong (2006). Other studies have provided evidence in favor of heterogeneous 
priors, (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1993, Kandel and Pearson 1995, Diether, Malloy and Scherbina 2002). 
Focusing on economic forecasting, Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2004) provide evidence that the nature of 
information (in the form of “sticky information”) can explain disagreement in surveys of inflation 
expectations. See D’Amico and Orphanides (2006) for a discussion of the difference between disagreement 
and uncertainty. 
3analytical framework of forecasters or analysts with certain given skill sets cluster in particular 
localities.2  
 
Finally, communication by the Federal Reserve may also shape the understanding of future 
action. However, whether Federal Reserve communication will lead forecasters to act 
homogenously or – similar to other information processing – heterogeneously depending on, for 
instance, location and skill levels, is open to discussion. In what follows, we will treat this mostly 
as an empirical matter. 
 
The paper uses a novel dataset of 268 professional forecasters – covering many major investment 
banks, commercial banks and forecasting institutions – who are located across 98 cities in 15 
countries, for FOMC decisions between February 1999 and September 2005. The dataset is very 
rich, containing not only each forecaster’s survey expectations for FOMC decisions, but also 
information about the individual’s forecasts of other economic variables, such as inflation and 
economic activity. Moreover, the data includes information related to analysts’ skills, e.g. the 
type of institution, his or her position within that institution, employment record and educational 
background. We combine this dataset with information about the economic conditions specific to 
the region in which each individual is located. 
 
As a key stylized fact, the degree of heterogeneity in the forecast performance across individuals 
is large: after grouping forecasters by performance over the full sample period, the absolute 
forecast error by the group of the 10% of the worst forecasters is 5 basis points (b.p.) higher than 
that of the best decile of analysts, when measured across all FOMC meetings. This difference 
rises to 10 b.p. when analyzing only those FOMC meetings that had some degree of heterogeneity 
across forecasters. This is of the same order of magnitude we have found for the heterogeneity of 
forecasts of ECB monetary policy decisions (Berger, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2006) and given 
the frequency of forecasters’ participation cannot be the result of pure chance.  
 
Another important result is that the observed differences in forecasting ability are relevant for 
financial market behavior, which has potentially important policy implications. We show that the 
larger the observed heterogeneity of monetary policy expectations, the higher is financial market 
volatility. This poses a challenge for central banks’ efforts to enhance transparency. Reducing 
uncertainty will reduce possible distortions in investment decisions, facilitate firms’ access to 
funds, and, more generally, increase the efficient allocation of capital in the economy.  
 
Next, we find that a significant part of the heterogeneity in forecasting accuracy is systematic. 
That is, there is compelling empirical evidence that skills and geography play a significant and 
substantial role. As to geography, we find that a number of locational factors systematically 
influence the ability of forecasters to anticipate US monetary policy. For instance, forecasters 
located in New York City or in other financial centers, either in the USA or abroad, as well as 
those located in Washington DC, i.e. in immediate proximity of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve, perform better on average. Moreover, we find that forecasters take a local 
perspective in the sense that regional economic developments shape their forecasting ability for 
US monetary policy. We take this as evidence that salience of information is an important factor 
in the forecasting process. 
 
As to skills, there are a number of factors that affect forecasters’ performance. For instance, 
analysts who work for investment banks do better than those in other financial and non-financial 
companies. Second, it is intriguing that analysts who have the position of Economist in their 
                                                 
2 Our paper is also related to the literature on information and geography. One strand of this literature 
emphasizes the role of information asymmetries for international capital flows (e.g., Ahearne, Griever, and 
Warnock 2004, Portes and Rey 2005, Dvorak 2005). A different strand stresses the importance of the 
geographic location of analysts in determining the profitability of investment (e.g. Coval and Moskowitz 
1999 & 2001, Hau 2001, Bae et al. 2008). 
4institution do better than forecasters with higher-ranking titles, in particular executives. Our 
interpretation is that executives are less specialized and can devote less time and resources to 
following the Fed. The results seem to support the limited attention hypothesis. Third, 
professional experience and education matter for forecast accuracy. We find that analysts who 
previously worked for the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors perform better, as do analysts 
with a Master’s degree. A related result of the empirical analysis is that forecasters who do well 
in predicting monetary policy also do well in anticipating other economic variables.  
 
Finally, we investigate how Federal Reserve communication affects the cross-sectional dispersion 
of interest rates forecasts in an extension to the main analysis. We find that more frequent as well 
as more informative communication reduces disparities in forecast performance across analysts 
stemming from differences in regional economic conditions. However, the impact of 
communication may not be homogenous across analysts. An intriguing result is that the superior 
forecast accuracy of some analysts appears to be related to their ability to extract relatively more 
or better information from existing Fed communication.3  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses in detail the data for the monetary policy 
forecasts. Section 3 starts by outlining our hypotheses before presenting the empirical results. 
Section 4 analyses the effectiveness of Federal Reserve communication to address the 
heterogeneity in expectations across analysts. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Data on Monetary Policy Expectations 
 
This paper is based on a novel and fairly rich dataset that allows us to analyze the disagreement 
among forecasters of FOMC decisions. The data contain a large amount of relevant background 
information on the individual forecasters. In this section, we describe the dataset before 
proceeding to discuss the economic relevance of the heterogeneity across forecasters for financial 
market outcomes. 
 
2.1  Data characteristics 
 
Our database consists of time-series information on monetary policy expectations and other 
variables for 268 professional forecasters – covering many major investment banks, commercial 
banks and forecasting institutions. The data comes from Bloomberg, which chooses which 
institutions and individuals to include in its survey of monetary policy expectations of the Federal 
Reserve. The survey consists of a simple question about what the analysts think will be the most 
likely policy decision of the FOMC in a given meeting.4 We have available forecasts for all 
scheduled FOMC meetings starting in 1999 until September 2005. 
 
Even though the expectations data is survey-based, its quality is high. One potential concern is 
about the effort individual analysts put into providing their input. However, there are a number of 
reasons suggesting that this is not a major concern. Most importantly, analysts are bound in their 
survey answers by their recommendations to clients. Hence an analyst for an investment bank, for 
instance, may find it hard to justify why he or she gave a recommendation different to the one of 
                                                 
3 These results are of relevance for the literature on the role of communication for monetary policy, 
underlining the importance of transparency. Central banks have a keen interest in guiding expectations of 
economic agents, in particular in financial markets; Blinder (1998) and Bernanke (2004), among others, 
stress the key role of communication in this regard. An emerging empirical literature, summarized in 
Blinder et al. (2007), suggests that communication is indeed a powerful tool for this purpose. 
4 The forecast horizon is therefore generally rather short (with a median of 5, an average of 11, and a 
maximum of 57 days). While uncertainty about upcoming decisions at this short horizon is certainly 
smaller than about the future path of interest rates at a longer horizon, we believe that similar determinants 
are likely to explain the diversity of longer-horizon forecasts. 
5the survey. And indeed, a series of tests discussed below indicates that the forecasts surveyed by 
Bloomberg are significantly linked to financial market behavior. 
 
There is also little evidence of selection bias in the cross-section. The way the survey works is 
that analysts can (but must not) provide their forecasts online at any time before the meeting. 
Thus, self selection could occur if, for instance, in times of heightened uncertainty “bad” 
forecasters decided to either systematically delay their participation in the survey or abstain 
completely. However, we find that the average forecasting errors made by participating analysts 
is independent from the number of participants.5 In addition, across forecasters for a given 
meeting, there is no systematic relationship between the precision of individual forecasts and the 
lead time of an individual forecast submission (i.e., the time between when the forecast is filed 
and the relevant FOMC decision).6 What we do find, for individuals over time, is a negative 
correlation between lead time and forecasting accuracy.7 This suggests that, as a group, analysts 
provide their forecasts at an earlier stage when decisions are easier to anticipate, while they enter 
their forecasts later, when FOMC decisions are harder to foresee. The empirical work in the main 
body of the paper will control for such common swings in overall forecasting behavior by 




The main interest of the paper lies in understanding and explaining the cross-sectional differences 
across analysts’ forecast performance of US monetary policy. How large and variable is this 
heterogeneity over time? Figure 1 shows the standard deviation of forecast errors across analysts 
for each FOMC meeting and the underlying average forecast mistake. While there is some 
variability in this measure over time, there is no clear trend or large outliers that can be identified. 
 
This leads us to an important question for the empirical analysis: How large is the heterogeneity 
in forecast performance across individual analysts? Ranking all forecasters by their average 
absolute forecast errors over the full sample period, we find that the 10% with the best 
performance have on average a forecast error that is about 5 b.p. lower than the worst-performing 
10%. However, as some decisions have been perfectly predicted by all market participants, a 
more informative comparison might look at forecast performance for the more difficult cases. 
Repeating this analysis therefore for all FOMC meetings where forecasters deviated in their 
predictions (and dropping observations for FOMC meetings without dissent), Figure 2 ranks all 
forecasters by their average absolute forecast errors over the full sample period, starting from the 
10% with the lowest average errors in decile 1 to the 10% with the largest mistakes in decile 10. 
                                                 
5 Regressing the average absolute forecast error across analysts for each FOMC meeting ts  on the number 
of survey participants Ft for that FOMC meeting (participation varies from a minimum of 11 to a maximum 
of 54 forecasters, with an average of 32) yields: 
)0981.0().52810(
0598.06267.1 ttt Fs ε++= , 
where the absolute forecast error for each individual si,t is defined as the absolute difference between the 
individual’s forecast rei,t and the actual Fed funds target rate set by the  FOMC rt  The OLS standard errors 
(in parentheses) indicate no significant relationship in the data between participation and the average 
forecast error across agents. 
6 Regressing the absolute forecast error si,t for each analyst on FOMC meetings on the lead time, in number 
of days (Li,t) with which he or she gives the forecasts, we find: 
)0046.0(
,,, 0175.0 tititi Ls ε+−= . 
Given the discrete nature of this variable, which changes in steps of 25 b.p., an ordered probit model is used 
for the above regression. The finding implies that a longer lead time is associated with a lower forecast 
error. Also note that all results below are robust to the inclusion of the lead time of a given forecast as an 
additional explanatory variable. 
7 Additional results available on request. 
6The figure shows a remarkable degree of heterogeneity that, in the light of the frequency of 
participation of forecasters, cannot be explained by chance alone: the best forecasters have on 
average a forecast error that is about 10 b.p. lower than the worst-performing analysts.8 
 
Figures 2 – 3 
 
In order to obtain a measure of cross-sectional heterogeneity robust with regard to self-selection 
(i.e., variations in participation of good or bad forecasters over time), we extract the time fixed 
effects. In other words, the time-corrected forecast errors are obtained as the residuals of 
regressing the absolute forecast error on a comprehensive set of time dummies (i.e., time fixed 
effects), which in essence just subtracts from each individual’s error the average error across all 
individuals for each meeting. Figure 3 shows the distribution of these time-corrected forecast 
errors across analysts. It confirms the large degree of heterogeneity, which remains unchanged at 
roughly 10 b.p. between the best and the worst forecast performers. 
 
2.2  Economic relevance of forecast heterogeneity  
 
Why is the analysis of forecast heterogeneity important? The presence of systematic forecaster 
heterogeneity has potentially important consequences for the real economy. If differing forecast 
accuracy ex ante leads to greater financial market volatility and uncertainty ex post, firms may 
find it more difficult to make investment decisions or to raise funds. As a consequence, the 
allocation of capital to its most efficient uses in investment or production may be distorted.  
 
Thus, before moving to the analysis of the determinants of this heterogeneity, it is worthwhile 
investigating the link between forecast heterogeneity and financial market behavior. The most 
natural way to address this issue is by testing whether heterogeneity matters for the way financial 
markets respond to the release of the monetary policy decisions by the Federal Reserve. Our 
hypothesis is that more heterogeneity ex ante, if reflected in trading positions, should lead to 
more volatility in financial markets ex post, as there are more positions that need adjusting.  
 
For that purpose, we test whether market volatility around the release of the FOMC decision, and 
in its aftermath, is related to the heterogeneity of the expectations expressed in the Bloomberg 
survey. Starting from tick-by-tick data, we calculate realized volatility for the S&P 500 futures as 
described in Andersen et al. (2003) as the sum of the squared minutely returns over four separate 
time windows.9 The first window precedes the release of the monetary policy decision at 14:15, 
ranging from 12:45 to 13:45. During the second window, which ranges from 13:45 to 14:45, the 
decision is released. The other two windows range from 14:45 to 15:30 and from 15:30 to the 
close of the market, which is usually at 16:00, and thus capture trading in the aftermath of the 
decision. In this fashion, we construct one observation for our dependent variable per time 
window per FOMC meeting.  
 
If t denotes the day of the FOMC meeting, and τ the time window analyzed, we aim to explain 
market volatility ( τσ ,t ) in response to the release of monetary policy decisions. Two determinants 
are of interest in our context: first, the magnitude of the surprise, as measured by the absolute 
mean forecast error reported in Bloomberg (
t
s ), and second, the heterogeneity of market 
                                                 
8 To verify the robustness of these differences, we exclude those forecasters from the sample who have 
participated in less than 25% of the forecasts over the sample period. 
9 We opt for S&P 500 futures rather than, e.g., 10-year U.S. Treasury Notes Futures, as the former is traded 
until 16:15 Eastern Time (as opposed to 15:00 for the latter), thus allowing for an extended analysis of 
market effects. Data for the S&P 500 futures are from TickData Inc. Starting from tick data, we calculate 
price data on a minute-by-minute frequency by linear interpolation of the two tick prices immediately 
before and after the full minute. From these price data, we calculate minutely returns, and finally realized 
volatility as the sum of the squared returns over the relevant time windows (see Andersen et al. 2003). 
7expectations, measured as the standard deviation of the surprises calculated across survey 
participant ( tψ ). In order to control for time variations in market volatility that are unrelated to 
monetary policy, we add another regressor, namely market volatility observed in the same time 
window on the preceding day, ( τσ ,1−t ).10 By using this particular time window, we ensure that 
our benchmark variable is not affected by time-of-the-day patterns in volatility. The model to be 
estimated is therefore as follows: 
 
τττ εψδγσβασ ,,1, tttt ts ++++= − .    (1) 
 
Note that the magnitude of the surprise and its heterogeneity are strongly correlated, with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.47. Accordingly, we perform regressions in three steps, by first 
including either one of the two explanatory variables 
t




Table 1 reports the results of the various estimated OLS models. Neither the magnitude of the 
monetary policy surprise, nor the heterogeneity affects market volatility in the time window prior 
to the release of the decision, as suggested by the adjusted R2 measures: model (1), which 
includes neither regressor, performs best. For the subsequent time window, which surrounds the 
release of the FOMC decision, the magnitude of the monetary policy surprise affects market 
volatility. With larger surprises, market volatility increases. In addition, however, also 
heterogeneity increases market volatility, in line with our hypothesis. As a matter of fact, the best 
model, judged by the adjusted R2 measure, contains both regressors. This picture changes for the 
remaining trading day, however. As of 14:45, the only relevant factor is the heterogeneity in 
expectations, explaining roughly 6% of the variation in market volatility, whereas the magnitude 
of the policy surprise is no longer a relevant factor.  
 
Looking at the estimated parameters for realized volatility in the same time window on the 
preceding day, it is apparent that markets wait for the release of the decision (as volatility is 
substantially lower just before the release), then react strongly to the release, with volatility 
increasing by a factor of 1.5 in the time window surrounding the release, and a factor of nearly 2 
in the window from 14:45 to 15:30 (in case the monetary policy decision has been perfectly 
predicted by all participants – otherwise, volatility increases by even more). Only in the last time 
window is volatility roughly back to what it was on preceding days, with an estimate near one.  
 
Overall, these findings suggest that more heterogeneity in expectations raises market volatility, 
significantly so and persistently so for the entire remaining trading day after the release of a 
monetary policy decision.  
 
 
                                                 
10 The value for realized volatility on the preceding day can be seen as a proxy for market uncertainty and 
volatility in general. Adding additional proxies for uncertainty, such as the surprise component contained in 
recent macroeconomic announcements (e.g. non-farm payrolls, CPI, industrial production and consumer 
confidence), the lead time by which Fed watchers make their forecasts of FOMC decisions, or the number 
of participants in a given survey, does not affect results. Results are not reported here for brevity, but 
available upon request. 
83.  What explains heterogeneity in forecast accuracy? 
 
The present section contains the core analysis of the paper. We start by discussing our hypotheses 
related to the role of geography and skills in influencing monetary policy forecasts, and continue 
by outlining the empirical methodology. We then turn to the empirical findings and robustness 
checks. 
 
3.1  Hypotheses and methodology  
 
How should we expect differences in information processing across analysts to shape their 
forecasting performance? For illustrative purposes, consider a limited attention model that departs 
from the assumption that individuals make decisions using all available information (e.g. Della 
Vigna 2007). In an attempt to simplify complex decisions, agents are likely to process only a 
subset of information. This might imply neglecting or overweighting of information. For instance, 
the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1973) suggests that individuals tend to place 
too much weight on information that is easily recalled – i.e., information that is especially salient 
or vivid. At the same time, heterogeneous priors can generate very similar results. Indeed, 
whether or not an agent disregards some information because she thinks that it is not important 
for the forecasting problem at hand, or whether she neglects it due to limited attention, is, in 
general, observationally equivalent.11 
 
To portray the decision problem we are interested in, assume that forecasters of monetary policy 
decisions derive disutility if their forecast deviates from the actual decisions. This could be 
because of reputational concerns (in relation to customers, peers, current or potential future 
employers), or because they trade based on this forecasts in financial markets, such as the Fed 
funds futures market.12 Accordingly, the loss function of individual forecaster i is described as: 
 
θθ −≡ )(ii EL  ,     (2) 
 
with θ  representing the upcoming interest rate decision and E(.) the expectations operator. In line 
of our earlier discussion, we should think of individuals i as differing with regard to their skill 
levels and/or location.  
  
Obviously, θ is ex ante unobservable and uncertain. However, agents receive signals which allow 
them to make informed forecasts about θ . For simplicity of exposition, let us restrict the number 
of signals to two. We assume that both signals are unbiased, but imperfect, as they contain some 
noise. The first signal is εθ +=x , where ε is i.i.d. with zero mean and variance 2εσ . The 
second signal is ηθ +=y , where η is also normally distributed with zero mean and variance 
                                                 
11 As mentioned earlier, differences in information availability – the second principle source of forecasting 
heterogeneity highlighted in the literature (Hong and Stein 2007) – seems less relevant in our context. 
Survey participants decide themselves at which point in time they enter their forecast. This allows them to 
wait until they have collected all relevant information. Furthermore, it is obvious that forecasters in a 
Bloomberg poll have access to financial newswire services. Given that these report on all aspects related to 
monetary policy as well as on relevant macroeconomic announcements in real time, we can assume that all 
agents have access to the same information at the same point in time, making gradual information a less 
interesting candidate for our case. 
12 This assumption excludes the possibility of a rational bias, whereby forecasters in certain institutions 
posit a biased forecast in order to attract publicity, as e.g. illustrated in Laster et al. (1999). As we argue 
below, this seems less of an issue in our dataset, where we find that forecast heterogeneity is mirrored in 
financial market positions. In addition, our empirical models include information about institutional 
affiliation, which should effectively capture any remaining rational bias. 
92
ησ . Defining the relative precisions of the signals as 2/1 εσα ≡  and 2/1 ησβ ≡  implies that the 
expected value of the fundamental θ  is 
 
yxyxE )1()/()()( γγβαβαθ −+=++= ,      (3) 
 
with )/( βααγ += . We assume that the central bank receives the same signals, but knows their 
relative precision. In this case, the expectation will ex post be realized, i.e. )(θθ E= . Agents, on 
the other hand, do not know the precision of both signals, but must estimate them. Identifying 
estimated values with a hat, equation (3) becomes 
 
yxyxE iiiiiii )ˆ1(ˆ)ˆˆ/()ˆˆ()( γγβαβαθ −+=++= .      (4) 
 
Finally, substituting equations (3) and (4) into (2) yields 
 
yxE ii −−=− γγθθ ˆ)( ,        (5) 
 
which illustrates that forecast accuracy depends on the stochastics of the information process, 
yx − , and, for our purpose more importantly, on the precision with which a forecaster 
processes the various signals that he or she receives or, more precisely, on the magnitude of the 
estimation error of γ, γγ −iˆ . 
 
The last result illustrates how differences in the ability to process information may generate 
disagreement among forecasters.13 Obviously, different skill sets across forecasters can result in 
differing priors. This will allow ji α≠α ˆˆ , ji ββ ˆˆ ≠ , and, ultimately, differing forecasting errors 
according to equation (5). Also, in the presence of limited attention, agents may overweight 
salient information resulting in, for instance, ji ββ ˆˆ >  if y is salient for i, but not for j. To give an 
extreme example, agents i in a particular location might focus on x and neglect y, 
choosing 0ˆ =iβ , which clearly leads to an inefficient forecast of θ, while elsewhere agents 
choose 0ˆ =jα , resulting in an equally inefficient but different forecast.   
 
In what follows, we will identify and explain cross-sectional differences across analysts’ forecast 
performance of US monetary policy along these lines. The key focus is on analyzing how much 
of this heterogeneity in expectations can be attributed to geography and how much to the skills of 
individual analysts. 
 
Turning to the explanatory variables and the underlying hypotheses, geography provides a 
specific economic and informational environment in which individuals operate, with potentially 
important consequences for forecasting performance. As to the informational environment, local 
information is bound to be relatively salient, and we would therefore expect that it enters the 
forecasting problem with large (and perhaps too large) weights. Pointing in the same directions is 
the fact that some information may only be available in certain locations or, equivalently, 
prohibitively priced elsewhere.14 In addition, geographically close forecasters may share certain 
                                                 
13 A possible extension of this model could consist in the existence of indirect signals for θ, such as 
ξθδδ ++= 10y , which would add parameter uncertainty to the model. Such an extension would not affect 
the main conclusions of our stylized model. 
14 As is common in the literature on trade in goods and financial assets, we approximate the availability and 
costliness of information through various measures of geographic “proximity”.  
10
priors, for instance, because dedicated “central bank watchers” tend to cluster in financial centers 
or close to the central bank.  
 
One implication is that analysts who are located close to the Board of Governors, i.e. in or close 
to Washington DC, or in large financial centers such as New York City may have an information 
advantage and should be expected to perform better in forecasting US monetary policy than 
others. The information advantage could stem from more direct contacts or interactions with the 
Federal Reserve, but it could also be related to the fact that Washington DC and financial centers 
have a high concentration of institutions focused on issues related to monetary policy, which 
allows more efficient information sharing and improves the forecast performance of analysts. 
More generally, it is possible that analysts located in the United States have better information 
about US monetary policy, e.g. through the easier and more diverse availability of various media, 
than analysts located abroad. Similarly, language may matter as one would expect that analysts 
working in an English-language environment have an information advantage over those working 
primarily in a foreign-language environment. As English is, however, widespread as a working 
language in particular among financial institutions also in non-English speaking countries, an 
English-language environment may in practice not provide much of a gain.   
 
We use various locational variables to capture this type of geographic proximity. First, the 
geographic coverage of the data is large, as our dataset includes 268 forecasters located across 98 
cities in 15 countries. Tables 2 and 3 provide an overview of the geographic coverage. 
 
Tables 2 – 3 
 
A second way in which geography may play an important role for forecasting accuracy is through 
the specific local or regional economic environment analysts are operating in. Location choices of 
institutions often imply that their businesses are more strongly connected to regional clients or 
partners. Thus information about the immediate geographic surroundings may be better and more 
ample. Institutions may therefore (consciously or unconsciously) use this regional or local 
knowledge to help make inferences about overall economic developments. For the anticipation of 
monetary policy, this means that analysts may be significantly influenced by their regional 
economic conditions when making predictions about US monetary policy. We have three such 
regional economic indicators – CPI inflation for the four US census regions (Northeast, Midwest, 
South and West), as well as personal income growth and employment growth for all US states – 
and can match these to the location of the analysts in our sample.15 To control for persistent 
differences in regional developments, we assume that analysts pay particular attention to 
deviations of regional developments from their respective long-term average. As any regional 
focus is likely to deviate from the aggregate perspective taken by policy makers in the FOMC 
(because analysts are putting too much weight on the economics information close to home), we 
would expect larger absolute deviations of current regional conditions from the regional norm to 
lead an analyst to make larger forecast errors.16  
 
Tables 4 – 5 
 
Tables 4 and 5 give summary statistics for all of these variables, as well as a breakdown of the 
information between the USA and abroad (Table 4), and across the individual regions of the 
                                                 
15 Regional CPI data, while providing less cross-sectional variance than metropolitan area CPI data, poses 
fewer matching problems with forecaster locations across the US. CPI inflation and nonfarm payroll data 
(Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics) are available real time, on a monthly frequency. Personal income 
growth data are quarterly (Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis). 
16 Ideally, we would like to test the same hypothesis for US national aggregate data. Unfortunately, this is 
not possible in the framework of model (1), as any variable which varies only across time, and not across 
analysts is wiped out by the set of time dummies. We however include below the absolute deviation of 
current US economic developments from their long-term average for non-US residents in the sample. 
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United States (Table 5). Out of the 268 analysts, 194 are located in the United States and 74 
abroad. There are a number of interesting and noteworthy characteristics in the data. For instance, 
about one third of all forecasters are based in financial centers, in particular New York City, but 




Regional economic conditions: Macro forecast performance: 
CPI inflation 
difference 
Absolute difference between 
current regional inflation and its 
sample average  
CPI inflation 
forecast 
D=1 if the individual’s average 
inflation forecast error is below 
sample median; D=0 otherwise 




Absolute difference between 
current regional income growth 




D=1 if the individual’s average 
industrial production forecast 
error is below sample median; 
D=0 otherwise or if no forecast 




Absolute difference between 
current regional growth in non-
farm payrolls and its sample 
average Individual background: 
  Institution:  
Location: 
Investment bank D=1 if analyst works for such 
institution; D=0 otherwise 
Distance to 
Federal Reserve 
Distance from Washington DC 
(in 1000 km) 
Commercial 
bank 
D=1 if analyst works for such 
institution; D=0 otherwise 
Washington DC D=1 if analyst is located in 
Washington DC; D=0 otherwise 
Forecast 
institution 
D=1 if analyst works for such 
institution; D=0 otherwise 
New York City D=1 if analyst is located in New 




D=1 if analyst is located in Chic-
ago, Boston, London, HK, Paris, 
Frankfurt, Madrid or S.Francisco 
Economist D=1 if analyst holds this job 
title; D=0 otherwise 
USA D=1 if analyst is located in 
neither DC, NYC or a US 
financial center, but resides in 
the US; D=0 otherwise 
Senior 
Economist 
D=1 if analyst holds this job 
title; D=0 otherwise 
English 
language 
D=1 if foreign analyst is located 
in Canada, UK, Ireland or 
Australia; D=0 otherwise 
Chief Economist D=1 if analyst holds this job 




Regional dummies each for the 
four US census regions 
Executive D=1 if analyst holds this job 
title; D=0 otherwise 
  Education:  
  Bachelor's 
degree 
D=1 if analyst has this as 
highest degree; D=0 otherwise 
  Master's degree D=1 if analyst has this as 
                                                 
17 Note that the definition of financial centers here is clearly not all encompassing, and one could also argue 
for alternative definitions. However, the empirical findings presented below are robust to changing the set 
of cities defined as financial centers, i.e. when extending the set of cities or when reducing it – for instance, 
when including Philadelphia or excluding San Francisco etc. 
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highest degree; D=0 otherwise 
  PhD degree D=1 if analyst has this as 
highest degree; D=0 otherwise 
  Employment history: 
  Fed Board of 
Governors 
D=1 if analyst worked for this 
institution before; D=0 else  
  Fed New York D=1 if analyst worked for this 
institution before; D=0 else 
  Neither Board 
nor NY Fed ex-
perience 
D=1 if analyst has worked for 
neither at the Board nor the Fed 
New York before; D=0 else 
 
 
Another possible determinant of analysts forecasting performance suggested by equation (5) are 
their skills. Higher skilled analysts either possess the correct priors as to what information to 
incorporate at which weights, or they focus their limited attention on the appropriate information. 
Therefore, we expect that the professional experience and employment record of analysts will 
have a significant effect on their performance in predicting Fed policy. In particular, someone 
who has previously worked for the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors, or possibly the New 
York Fed, may have a superior understanding of the functioning of the FOMC and its 
communication. In addition, technical expertise is likely to give analysts with a Master’s or Ph.D. 
degree as an educational background an edge in the forecasts. Also, we would expect that the 
forecast performance of analysts is linked to the resources their institutions provide them with. 
Accordingly, the type of institution an analyst works for may matter. For instance, anticipating 
monetary policy decisions may be even more important for investment banks or specialized 
forecast institutions than for other financial or non-financial institutions. Finally, the degree of 
specialization might matter – individuals who conduct a number of other tasks on their job have 
less attention to devote to the FOMC forecast, which could affect their forecasting performance. 
 
In addition to personal characteristics – which  obviously rather indirect ways of approximating 
the skills and ability of analysts –we also have a more direct measure of their forecasting skills. In 
particular, our dataset includes the forecasts of other economic variables – CPI inflation and 
industrial production – made by many of the analysts in our sample. As both variables are also 
highly relevant for monetary policy decisions, we would expect that analysts who perform well in 
predicting US inflation and industrial production are also better in anticipating US monetary 
policy decisions at that particular point in time. To capture the overall quality or skill level in the 
empirical implementation we focus on the relative quality of forecasters compared to the sample 
median across time and individuals. 
 
Tables 4 and 5 offer some summary statistics for these skills-related variables. Some interesting 
features of the data emerge. For instance, there is some concentration of analysts across 
institutions as almost half of them work for investment banks. We also find that a relatively large 
share of analysts hold a Ph.D. or Master’s degree, while the distribution across job positions is 
relatively even. It should be noted that employment and education backgrounds are not available 
for several analysts. We therefore created a separate variable for these, included under “no 
information”. 
 
Turning to the empirical methodology, we want to explain the absolute forecast error si,t for each 
FOMC meeting by each individual analyst. We restrict the analysis to those individuals who have 
participated in the survey more than 10 times. As si,t is discrete, taking either the value of 0, 25 or 
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where tis ,ˆ  is an unobserved latent variable that relates to the observable forecast error according 






















The κ’s are unknown parameters to be estimated with the coefficient vector β, and ti ,ε is a well-
behaved error term.18 
 
The model controls for time fixed effects by including a full set of time dummies αt. As 
mentioned above, our focus is on the cross-sectional differences across analysts’ forecast 
performance. We therefore want to control for the fact that some FOMC decisions may be more 
difficult to predict than others, and to avoid the resulting potential self-selection bias. Note that 
this also implies that the empirical findings are effectively based only on those FOMC meeting in 
which there was some cross-section heterogeneity. 
 
 
3.2  Empirical results 
 
Our modeling strategy is to start by analyzing the role of geography in explaining forecast errors 
of US monetary policy, then to move to skills and finally to combine both sets of variables in a 
single model. 
 
3.2.1  Geography 
 
Table 6 presents the results for the geography variables in the ordered probit model, using 
different specifications. Model (1) shows the influence of distance, an often used proxy for 
information costs in the literature on trade in goods and financial assets. However, we find that 
greater distance from Washington DC, the seat of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors, is 
not associated with a statistically significantly higher forecast error. In model (2), we ask whether 
there are differences across the four US regions and indeed find that analysts located in the 
Northeast and the Midwest perform significantly better than those of the excluded group from the 
model, in this case all non-US analysts. Part of the reason for this better performance may be that 
the Northeastern and Midwestern regions include most of the major financial centers of the 




In model (3), we therefore test the role of specific locations. We find that analysts based in 
Washington DC, in New York City, and in other financial centers do better than analysts located 
                                                 
18 Interpreting β can be difficult, especially when using explanatory dummy variables. For instance, 
depending on the cut-off points, a negative dummy coefficient could indicate that a 50 basis-point error is 
less likely but a 25 basis-point error is more likely when the variable takes the value 1. However, this case 
is not relevant in our sample. As a robustness check and to ease interpretation, we will report OLS results in 
addition to ordered probit estimates in what follows. 
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elsewhere.19 By contrast, forecasters in other US locations, or those based in countries with 
English as the main language do not appear to make smaller forecast errors than other foreign 
analysts (model (4)). What this suggests is that there are indeed strong information advantages in 
financial hubs, pointing to an important role of geographic “proximity” (recall that all analysts 
have access to financial newswire services, such that unequal access to information should not 
generate this result). 
 
The second proxy for the role of geography is the regional economic environment analysts 
operate in. Model (5) shows the point estimates for the absolute difference of CPI inflation, 
income growth and employment growth from their averages over the whole sample period. The 
results indicate that regional conditions indeed play a role, with larger deviations in inflation and 
employment growth leading to significantly higher forecast errors about US monetary policy.20 
 
Finally, model (6) combines the various location and regional conditions variables in a single 
estimation. The results are generally robust to this extension, though the effect of financial centers 
other than New York City does not remain statistically significant. On the other hand, the 
combined model identifies an additional, albeit only marginally significant, effect of deviations in 
regional income growth, with larger absolute deviations pointing to larger forecast errors. 
Estimates of the same model by OLS (i.e., ignoring the discrete nature of the forecast error) 
confirm the findings of the ordered probit models, with slight changes in the significance level of 
regional macroeconomic differences. 
 
 
3.2.2  Skills 
 
Table 7 gives the empirical results for the effects of various measures of analysts’ skills and 
ability on forecast performance; first only for each category, then by combining the different skill 




Regarding institutional affiliations, in model (1) we find that analysts who work for investment 
banks have significantly lower forecast errors of FOMC decisions compared to the excluded 
benchmark group, namely analysts working for other financial or non-financial institutions and 
academics. The coefficient for individuals working for forecast institutions is slightly 
insignificant in this specification, although such analysts are found to perform marginally better 
in the more complete specification of model (6). 
 
As to job classifications, forecasters with the job title of Economist, Senior Economist or Chief 
Economist appear to perform significantly better than analysts who are executives in their 
institutions and form the excluded category in the regression. This may seem somewhat 
surprising as one may expect that executives have more experience and thus should be able to 
predict US monetary policy decisions at least equally well. One interpretation is that executives 
have a multitude of tasks and therefore have less time to acquire or maintain the specific expertise 
to do well in anticipating FOMC decisions. The results may also be influenced by an omitted 
variable bias as, for instance, forecasters who have the title of an executive may disproportionally 
work for specific institution types, such as small think tanks or non-financial institutions, and thus 
do worse merely because of their affiliation. However, model (6) shows that the findings with 
                                                 
19 Note that it is not straightforward to interpret the coefficients, due to the non-linear nature of the ordered 
probit model, as the coefficients give only the marginal effects at each variable’s mean. We will return to a 
more detailed discussion of the marginal effects and their interpretation further below. 
20 These results are generated by a bias, whereby higher than normal inflation leads to an overestimation of 
interest rates, and (to some extent) higher than normal real developments to an underestimation. 
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regard to the superior performance of economists and chief economists are robust when 
controlling for the full set of institutional and other analyst characteristics. 
 
In addition, the employment history matters for forecast performance. Model (3) shows that 
individuals who have worked for the Board of Governors in the past do a significantly better job 
in anticipating FOMC decisions. Again, this finding is robust to controlling for the full set of skill 
determinants, as shown in model (6). This result suggests that having first-hand knowledge in the 
functioning and thinking of the Federal Reserve should provide an analyst with a valuable 
advantage compared to other analysts in predicting FOMC decisions. 
 
Fourth, the educational background appears to also play a significant role. Interestingly, analysts 
with a Ph.D. – the excluded category in model (4) – do significantly worse than those with a 
Master’s degree. Two possible explanations come to mind for this result. On the one hand, it may 
imply that specific technical expertise may not be crucial for being a good forecaster of US 
monetary policy. On the other hand, it may indicate that it is not the level of the degree, but the 
quality or type of degree – for which we do not have information – that explains this effect. For 
instance, those who have a Master’s degree as their last degree may have an MBA, which in turn 
may signal something specific about the effort and qualifications of these analysts. 
 
Finally, a much more direct proxy for the skills of analysts is their ability to forecast other 
economic variables, such as US inflation and industrial production developments. While there is 
no effect of the quality of industrial production forecasts on the accuracy of forecasts of monetary 
policy decisions, model (5) indicates that indeed analysts who are, on average, better in predicting 
the next inflation figure after an FOMC meeting than the sample median are also better in 
correctly anticipating the FOMC decision. Overall, this finding is probably the strongest direct 
evidence that skills matter for the forecast accuracy of US monetary policy. 
 
Controlling for the robustness of results by re-estimating the combined model (6) using OLS 
corroborates the findings in general, as shown in column (7), with only one change: the superior 
performance of chief economists turns insignificant.  
 
3.2.3  Geography versus skills 
 
As the final part of the analysis, we include the various proxies for geography and for individual 
skills in the same model specification. It is important to combine the different categories in order 
to counter the possibility that geography and skills of analysts are not independent from one 
another. This may imply that what we measure as the effect of geography could at least in part 
reflect differences in the skill set of analysts, or vice versa effects of skills may represent the 
impact of geography. If, for instance, skilled analysts tended to move to New York City 
disproportionally, then the geography variable for New York City may pick up this concentration 
of skills, rather than information alone. However, the causality of this relationship could also be 
the reverse in that institutions move their analysts to New York or another major financial center 




Table 8 provides the empirical findings for this combined model. Overall, the results are mostly 
robust as most of the variables retain their statistical significance. In only a few cases do variables 
lose their statistical significance. For instance, the professional experience of having worked for 
the Federal Reserve before does enter the expanded ordered probit model only marginally 
significant. Only minor changes are apparent when non-US residents are dropped from the 
sample, as shown in the second set of results in Table 8. In this case, professional Fed experience 
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regains its significance, whereas regional inflation differences become statistically insignificant. 
21 
 
In order to obtain a more direct proxy for the quantitative effect of each of the variables on the 
monetary policy forecast error, we estimate the same model using OLS. The results shown in the 
right-hand side columns of Table 8 support the previous qualitative and statistical findings for the 
geography variables. Quantitatively, according to the linear model, analysts based in New York 
or in another financial center perform on average about 2 b.p. better than others. This gain is even 
more pronounced for analysts based in Washington DC, who have on average a forecast error that 
is 4 b.p. lower. 
 
The significance of most of the skill variables is also confirmed in the combined model. 
Institutions, job position and educational background all continue to exert a substantial impact on 
forecast accuracy. Equally importantly, analysts who do well in predicting the next inflation 
figure are also more accurate in predicting the next FOMC meeting. In fact, analysts who are 
better than the mean in forecasting inflation have a roughly 1.7 b.p. lower forecast error. 
 
In summary, both geography and individual skills play a substantial role for the forecast accuracy 
of US monetary policy decisions. In particular the magnitude of the effects of several of the 
geography and skill proxies underline the overall large importance they have in explaining the 
heterogeneity in the ability of agents to anticipate policy decisions by the Federal Reserve. 
 
 
4.  The Role of Fed Communication 
 
There is a rapidly growing literature on the importance of communication for the predictability of 
the Federal Reserve and other central banks (see Blinder et al. 2007). However, almost all of the 
studies in this literature concentrate on the mean or consensus expectations of financial markets. 
By contrast, our objective in this section is to analyze the effect of communication on the 
heterogeneity of expectations across individual market participants. 
 
Heterogeneity of expectations is at least in part undesirable from a monetary policy perspective as 
it may create significant differences in the understanding of FOMC policy decisions and thus the 
transmission process of policy. A key question therefore is: what can a central bank do to affect 
this heterogeneity in expectations? In particular, what role does communication play in this 
regard? Communication is potentially a powerful tool not only to convey a particular policy 
message and alter the consensus or mean of expectations, but may also be used to influence the 
degree of heterogeneity among market participants. This section analyses to what extent Fed 
communication has exerted such an influence on the heterogeneity of expectations in the past, 
and through what channels this effect has functioned. More precisely, we ask whether 
communication policy can be used in a systematic manner so as to reduce this heterogeneity 
stemming from differences in geography and skills, and thus promote a more homogenous 
understanding of monetary policy. Note that there are clear indications that communication is a 
powerful tool in this regard: during the period of explicit forward guidance by the FOMC through 
the so-called “measured pace”-statements, cross-forecaster heterogeneity has basically vanished 
from our dataset (see Figure 1). 
 
A more detailed identification of effects of Fed communication on heterogeneity in forecast 
accuracy is not without difficulties. Traditional measures of Fed communication do not entail a 
geographic component (see below). As a result, the empirical approach has to rely on interaction 
                                                 
21 Results are furthermore robust to the inclusion of a variable that measures the lead time of a given 
forecast, to including the number of forecasts an individual had previously filed in the Bloomberg survey, 
to separating forecasters into those that make a good macro forecasts, those whose forecast are below the 
median, and those who do not make forecasts at all.  
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terms – that is, we ask whether the effect of the variables explaining the heterogeneity of forecast 
accuracy varies as the Fed communicates. However, identification through interaction terms is an 
indirect approach that may or may not be sufficient to capture all effects of Fed communication. 
Ultimately, of course, this is an empirical question. 
 
For this purpose, we take the data on communication by FOMC members developed in Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher (2007), which is available until the FOMC meeting in May 2004, and investigate 
the effect on the heterogeneity of expectations and its channels. Based on newswire service 
reports of statements about the monetary policy inclination by FOMC members during the inter-
meeting period, two measures of Fed communication policy can be distinguished:22 
 
First, we employ the frequency of Fed communication (measured as the number of statements 
recorded in the dataset during an inter-meeting period) as a proxy for the information content of 
Fed communication for each inter-meeting period. The hypothesis is as follows: more 
information provided by the Federal Reserve should not only enhance the ability of market 
participants to anticipate the subsequent FOMC decision, but also reduce the heterogeneity in 
expectations across agents if this information is understood and processed by all agents in a 
similar way. 
 
Second, we analyze the effect of communication dispersion, i.e. the extent of disagreement across 














, with N the number of statements in the inter-meeting period that 
ends on meeting day t, C the statements classified as dovish, neutral or hawkish as {-1,0,+1}, and 
a dummy D with D=0 if N is an even number and D=1 if it is odd. This normalization allows us 
to obtain a dispersion measure that lies strictly between zero (no dispersion) and one. Our prior is 
that if there is a high degree of disagreement, then it should raise uncertainty about the upcoming 
FOMC policy decision and thus also increase the heterogeneity in expectations. 
 
To test whether communication policy helps reduce the effects that differences in geography and 
skills have on the heterogeneity of expectations, we estimate an extension of model (6) which 
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Note that the communication variable ct alone cannot be included in model (7) due to the 
inclusion of the time fixed effects αt. Our key hypothesis of interest is H0: γk =0. Whenever γk is 
different from zero, the model identifies that Fed communication affects forecast heterogeneity; if 
the sign of a γk is opposite of the sign of the corresponding βk (where k refers to the kth 
explanatory variable included in Xi,t), communication reduces heterogeneity; in the case of 
equally signed coefficients, it tends to enhance it instead. Recall from Tables 6-8 that most of the 
coefficients βk of the benchmark models are negative – for instance, being located in a financial 
center reduces the forecast error si,t of an analyst. This means that γk  >0 implies that a particular 
communication policy reduces or even eliminates the impact of a particular geographic or skill-
related characteristic on the absolute forecast error. By contrast, γk  <0 entails that communication 
has the opposite effect of widening the information asymmetries and thus the dispersion in 
forecast accuracy. For the variables measuring regional macroeconomic disparities, the 
interpretation is reversed, as these yielded positive coefficients βk in model (6). 
 
                                                 
22 A detailed outline and explanation of the data and its underlying methodology is provided in Ehrmann 




Table 9 shows the results for the interaction coefficients γk. A first central finding is that Fed 
communication appears to be successful in reducing the heterogeneity in forecast accuracy 
stemming from disparities in regional economic conditions. For instance, a higher frequency of 
communication reduces the effect of regional income growth differentials on the heterogeneity of 
forecast errors. Somewhat surprisingly, also a more dispersed communication flow from the Fed 
to the public helps analysts overcome some of the confusion stemming from diverging regional 
economic conditions. We interpret this result as being indicative that Fed communication indeed 
succeeds in reducing information asymmetries that come from the differences in regional 
economic conditions which influence agents’ expectations about FOMC policy decisions. 
 
A second finding is that Fed communication mostly raises the heterogeneity in forecast 
performance that stems from differences in the skills and abilities of individual analysts, as 
suggested by the mostly negative coefficients. For instance, communication reduces the forecast 
error of analysts working at investment banks, commercial banks and forecast institutions, i.e. 
those analysts who on average show lower forecast errors of US monetary policy decisions. 
Similar evidence is found for differences in education: analysts with Master’s degrees benefit 
relatively more from Fed communication in terms of improved forecast performance. An 
interpretation of this result is that those analysts who are relatively good in anticipating FOMC 
policy decisions obtain these superior forecast skills at least partly from their ability to better 
extract information from Fed communication. 
 
Finally, there is also some limited evidence that communication plays a role for geographic 
characteristics of analysts. In fact, Fed communication improves the forecast performance of 
analysts based in New York City or the United States; though in other cases the point estimates 
are not statistically significant. 
 
In summary, Fed communication appears to reduce information asymmetries along some 
dimensions, but may increase it along others. On the one hand, the results suggest that 
communication can indeed be effective in reducing disparities in forecast performance across 
analysts stemming from differences in regional economic conditions. Thus communication in 
some instances appears successful in reducing information asymmetries across market 
participants. On the other hand, at least part of the superior forecast accuracy stemming from 
analysts’ individual background appears to be related to their ability to extract more or better 
information from Fed communication. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
The monetary policy of the Federal Reserve has become increasingly predictable over time, also 
given its remarkable progress towards more transparency. This process has not only led to fewer 
monetary policy actions that have surprised the public, it has also synchronized the views of 
individual Fed watchers. However, disagreement among market participants remains, and is still 
sizable. Based on a novel dataset of 268 professional forecasters located across 98 cities in 15 
countries, we found that the degree of heterogeneity in the forecast performance across 
individuals is large: the average absolute forecasts error by the group of the 10% of the worst 
forecasters is 5 b.p. higher than that of the best decile of analysts (10 b.p. if we focus on FOMC 
meetings where not all forecasters agreed).  
 
The paper has demonstrated that this heterogeneity is economically meaningful as it has 
repercussions for trading behavior, by significantly increasing financial market volatility. This 
could distort investment decisions of firms, make it more difficult for firms to raise funds for 
investment or production, and could decrease the efficient allocation of capital.  
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As to the determinants of forecast heterogeneity, we have shown the relevance of locational 
factors. Importantly, the paper has found that monetary policy expectations exhibit a significant 
and systematic regional pattern in the United States, in that regional economic developments 
shape their forecasting ability about monetary policy. In particular, forecasters make larger errors 
the more economic developments in their home region differ from their average. As to the role of 
skills, a revealing point of the empirical analysis is that forecasters that are good in forecasting 
inflation also perform well in predicting monetary policy decisions. Moreover, analysts who work 
for investment banks or specialized forecast institutions, have a graduate degree or have an 
employment history with the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors all conduct better forecasts. 
 
What do these findings imply for policy? First of all, it should be stressed that not all 
heterogeneity in expectations is necessarily undesirable from a policy perspective, in particular if 
such differences are the result of different degrees of investment in information gathering by 
analysts’ institutions. Moreover, differential expectations about policy decisions may at times 
also provide useful information to policy-makers. Therefore, the primary nature of the analysis of 
the paper is a positive one, i.e. to document the magnitude and understand the determinants of the 
heterogeneity in monetary policy expectations.  
 
At the same time, some of the analysis has also normative implications, though these can be no 
more than tentative and suggestive. Clearly, it is desirable for central banks to disseminate 
information and knowledge as equally as possible across agents not least because a high degree of 
heterogeneity is likely to result in financial market uncertainty and volatility. Our empirical 
findings indicate that Fed communication policies have indeed been successful in reducing 
disparities in forecast performance stemming from differences in regional economic conditions. 
However, communication appears to have been less successful in addressing those disparities that 
stem from differences in skills of analysts. In particular the fact that such heterogeneity is linked 
to regional factors, which significantly influence forecasters’ expectations, raises many issues for 
policy-makers, such as the choice of communication tools and strategies to enhance a more 
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Note: The upper panel shows the average absolute forecast error (in b.p.) across individual forecasters for 
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Note: The figure shows the average absolute forecast error in b.p. by individual forecaster, ranging from the 
decile with the lowest forecast errors in decile 1 to those 10% with the highest prediction error in decile 10, 
for those FOMC meetings in which there was heterogeneity in expectations across individual forecasters. 
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Figure 3:  Distribution of time-corrected forecast errors across individual 
































Note: The figure shows the average absolute time-corrected forecast error in b.p. by individual forecaster, 
ranging from the decile with the lowest forecast errors in decile 1 to those 10% with the highest prediction 





Table 1:  The effect of monetary policy surprises and heterogeneity in expectations 
on the S&P 500 futures 
 
coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err.
Absolute surprise -- -- -0.016 0.025 -- -- -0.005 0.029
Heterogeneity -- -- -- -- -0.037 0.046 -0.034 0.054
Volatility, preceding day 0.327 ** 0.124 0.326 ** 0.125 0.327 ** 0.126 0.326 ** 0.127
# observations
Adjusted R2
Absolute surprise -- -- 1.381 ** 0.614 -- -- 0.874 0.556
Heterogeneity -- -- -- -- 2.143 *** 0.697 1.544 ** 0.635
Volatility, preceding day 1.388 ** 0.665 1.471 ** 0.624 1.442 *** 0.527 1.479 *** 0.544
# observations
Adjusted R2
Absolute surprise -- -- 0.332 * 0.187 -- -- 0.128 49.725
Heterogeneity -- -- -- -- 0.709 *** 0.250 0.622 ** 0.261
Volatility, preceding day 1.902 *** 0.510 1.906 *** 0.512 1.887 *** 0.490 1.890 *** 0.497
# observations
Adjusted R2
Absolute surprise -- -- 0.052 0.061 -- -- -0.035 0.049
Heterogeneity -- -- -- -- 0.236 *** 0.072 0.260 *** 0.077




























Note: The table explains volatility of the S&P 500 futures returns on FOMC announcement days through 
the magnitude of the monetary policy surprise (measured by the absolute mean forecast error in the 
Bloomberg survey), the heterogeneity in market expectations (measured by the standard deviation of the 
individual forecast errors) and volatility during the identical time window on the preceding trading day. 
FOMC releases are made at 14:15. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3:  City coverage 
 
Albany  Copenhagen  Jupiter  New Canaan  Saint Louis  
Amsterdam  Danville  Kennesaw  New Haven Saint Petersburg  
Ann Arbor  Detroit  King of Prussia New York City Salt Lake City  
Arlington Dublin  Leeds Newport Beach  San Francisco  
Atlanta  East Lansing  Lexington Northville  Silicon Valley
Baltimore  El Paso  Lisbon Oakland  Stamford  
Berlin  Essen  Lisle Omaha  Stockholm  
Birmingham  Fairfield  Little Rock Ottawa  Stuttgart  
Bonn  Frankfurt am Main  London Paris  Sydney  
Boston Greenwich  Los Angeles  Pasadena  Tempe  
Boulder Hamburg  Lugano  Pepper Pike  Toronto  
Bridgeport  Hannover  Madrid  Philadelphia  Utrecht  
Burlington  Hoboken  McLean  Phoenixville Valhalla  
Calabasas  Holland Menomonee Falls  Pittsburgh  Vineland  
Chapel Hill Hong Kong Milan  Potomac  Washington DC
Charlotte  Honolulu  Milwaukee  Princeton  West Chester  
Chicago  Houston  Minneapolis  Raleigh  Wilmington
Cleveland  Islandia Montreal  Richmond  Zug  
College Park Jacksonville Muenchen  Rome  







Table 4:  Summary statistics, US and foreign forecasters 
 
# obs mean std. dev. min. max. # obs mean # obs mean
Dependent variable:
Monetary policy forecast error 268 3.17 4.49 0 25 194 3.40 74 2.56
Location:
Distance to Federal Reserve 268 2.06 2.70 0 13.11 194 0.75 74 5.71
Washington DC 268 0.05 0.22 0 1 194 0.07 74 0.00
New York City 268 0.26 0.44 0 1 194 0.35 74 0.00
Financial center 268 0.17 0.37 0 1 194 0.13 74 0.27
USA 268 0.72 0.45 0 1 194 1.00 74 0.00
English language 268 0.81 0.40 0 1 194 1.00 74 0.30
Foreign 268 0.28 0.45 0 1 194 0.00 74 1.00
Regional economic conditions:
CPI inflation difference 268 0.571 0.211 0.030 1.496 194 0.580 74 0.547
Income growth difference 268 0.021 0.010 0.001 0.063 194 0.023 74 0.017
Employment growth difference 268 0.014 0.007 0.000 0.040 194 0.015 74 0.011
Individual background
Institution:
     Investment bank 268 0.47 0.50 0 1 194 0.51 74 0.35
     Commercial bank 268 0.23 0.42 0 1 194 0.12 74 0.51
     Forecast institution 268 0.15 0.36 0 1 194 0.19 74 0.04
     Other institution 268 0.16 0.36 0 1 194 0.18 74 0.09
Job position:
     Economist 268 0.12 0.33 0 1 194 0.08 74 0.24
     Senior Economist 268 0.07 0.26 0 1 194 0.08 74 0.05
     Chief Economist 268 0.26 0.44 0 1 194 0.30 74 0.15
     Executive 268 0.18 0.38 0 1 194 0.20 74 0.14
     No information 268 0.36 0.48 0 1 194 0.34 74 0.42
Education:
     Bachelor's degree 268 0.04 0.20 0 1 194 0.04 74 0.04
     Master's degree 268 0.19 0.39 0 1 194 0.22 74 0.09
     PhD degree 268 0.21 0.41 0 1 194 0.27 74 0.04
     No information 268 0.56 0.50 0 1 194 0.46 74 0.82
Employment history:
     Fed Board of Governors 268 0.04 0.20 0 1 194 0.06 74 0.00
     Fed New York 268 0.02 0.15 0 1 194 0.03 74 0.00
     Neither Board nor Fed NY 268 0.59 0.49 0 1 194 0.60 74 0.57
     No information 268 0.35 0.48 0 1 194 0.31 74 0.43
Macro forecast performance
CPI inflation forecast 121 0.001 0.007 -0.002 0.069 76 0.000 45 0.003




Note: “No information” means that individuals have not provided any entry for a particular item. 
 
28
Table 5:  Summary statistics, by US region 
 
# obs mean # obs mean # obs mean # obs mean
Dependent variable:
Monetary policy forecast error 100 3.05 32 3.13 45 3.55 17 6.13
Location:
Distance to Federal Reserve 100 0.36 32 0.97 45 0.48 17 3.70
Washington DC 100 0.00 32 0.00 45 0.29 17 0.00
New York City 100 0.68 32 0.00 45 0.00 17 0.00
Financial center 100 0.10 32 0.34 45 0.00 17 0.27
USA 100 1.00 32 1.00 45 1.00 17 1.00
English language 100 1.00 32 1.00 45 1.00 17 1.00
Foreign 100 0.00 32 0.00 45 0.00 17 0.00
Regional economic conditions:
CPI inflation difference 100 0.541 32 0.680 45 0.597 17 0.571
Income growth difference 100 0.027 32 0.014 45 0.022 17 0.019
Employment growth difference 100 0.016 32 0.012 45 0.014 17 0.014
Individual background
Institution:
     Investment bank 100 0.65 32 0.34 45 0.27 17 0.67
     Commercial bank 100 0.11 32 0.22 45 0.07 17 0.07
     Forecast institution 100 0.15 32 0.22 45 0.29 17 0.13
     Other institution 100 0.09 32 0.22 45 0.38 17 0.13
Job position:
     Economist 100 0.10 32 0.03 45 0.07 17 0.07
     Senior Economist 100 0.11 32 0.09 45 0.02 17 0.07
     Chief Economist 100 0.32 32 0.31 45 0.27 17 0.27
     Executive 100 0.16 32 0.31 45 0.20 17 0.20
     No information 100 0.31 32 0.25 45 0.42 17 0.40
Education:
     Bachelor's degree 100 0.04 32 0.06 45 0.04 17 0.00
     Master's degree 100 0.24 32 0.28 45 0.13 17 0.20
     PhD degree 100 0.30 32 0.16 45 0.36 17 0.07
     No information 100 0.42 32 0.50 45 0.47 17 0.73
Employment history:
     Fed Board of Governors 100 0.08 32 0.03 45 0.04 17 0.00
     Fed New York 100 0.06 32 0.00 45 0.00 17 0.00
     Neither Board nor Fed NY 100 0.61 32 0.63 45 0.58 17 0.53
     No information 100 0.25 32 0.34 45 0.38 17 0.47
Macro forecast performance
CPI inflation forecast 56 0.000 8 0.000 7 0.000 5 0.000






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8:  Geography versus individual skills: explaining the accuracy of forecasts of FOMC 
monetary policy decisions 
 
 
coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err.
Location:
Washington DC -1.148 ** 0.452 -0.961 ** 0.411 -4.023 *** 1.447
New York City -0.380 ** 0.192 -0.288 ** 0.146 -2.090 ** 0.976
Financial center -0.459 *** 0.173 -0.398 ** 0.185 -2.196 *** 0.853
USA -0.089 0.190 -0.752 0.963
English language 0.101 0.236 0.421 1.089
Regional economic conditions:
CPI inflation difference 0.379 ** 0.181 0.207 0.190 2.806 ** 1.161
Income growth difference 10.596 * 6.026 11.182 * 5.930 32.597 32.043
Employment growth difference 13.482 ** 5.691 13.151 ** 5.756 62.426 ** 27.536
Individual background
Institution:
     Investment bank -0.429 ** 0.178 -0.378 ** 0.189 -1.916 ** 0.896
     Commercial bank -0.181 0.195 -0.097 0.223 -0.859 0.992
     Forecast institution -0.355 * 0.193 -0.311 0.202 -1.541 0.966
Job position:
     Economist -0.480 * 0.270 -1.132 ** 0.504 -2.047 * 1.194
     Senior Economist -0.137 0.233 -0.241 0.268 -0.673 1.089
     Chief Economist -0.165 0.184 -0.413 ** 0.203 -0.765 0.943
     No information 0.014 0.201 -0.257 0.216 0.127 1.027
Employment history:
     Fed Board of Governors -0.409 0.258 -0.496 ** 0.252 -1.820 * 0.969
     Fed New York -0.087 0.210 -0.091 0.213 -0.402 1.036
     No information -0.086 0.142 0.020 0.185 -0.810 0.704
Education:
     Bachelor's degree -0.140 0.291 0.225 0.341 -0.760 1.317
     Master's degree -0.398 *** 0.147 -0.359 ** 0.148 -1.744 ** 0.684
     No information -0.030 0.145 -0.102 0.157 0.041 0.708
Macro forecast performance
CPI inflation forecast -0.459 *** 0.166 -0.525 *** 0.190 -1.733 *** 0.641
Industrial production forecast 0.157 0.160 0.121 0.178 0.647 0.708
# of observations
McFadden's adj. R2 (OLS: adj. R2)
Cragg-Uhler (Nagelkerke) adj. R2









Notes: See tables 6 and 7 for the definition of the variables. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 
90% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9: The role of Federal Reserve communication policy for geography and skills 
 
 
coef. std. err. coef. std. err.
Location:
Washington DC -0.345 0.400 -1.199 1.462
New York City -0.363 ** 0.168 -0.570 0.703
Financial center -0.099 0.171 -0.532 0.749
USA -0.410 ** 0.198 -1.434 0.892
English language 0.149 0.272 1.221 1.333
Regional economic conditions:
CPI inflation difference -0.025 0.166 -0.336 0.981
Income growth difference -0.897 ** 0.422 -2.782 ** 1.198
Employment growth difference -0.029 0.169 0.318 0.730
Individual background
Institution:
     Investment bank -0.538 *** 0.210 -2.961 *** 0.799
     Commercial bank -0.848 *** 0.229 -3.757 *** 0.934
     Forecast institution -0.596 *** 0.232 -2.751 *** 0.933
Job position:
     Economist 0.684 ** 0.271 2.265 * 1.166
     Senior Economist 0.296 0.237 1.195 0.914
     Chief Economist 0.356 * 0.198 1.142 0.802
     No information 0.309 0.217 0.410 0.866
Employment history:
     Fed Board of Governors -0.186 0.239 -1.078 0.880
     Fed New York -0.152 0.168 -0.179 0.726
     No information -0.178 0.148 -0.043 0.610
Education:
     Bachelor's degree 0.021 0.291 -1.240 1.098
     Master's degree -0.378 *** 0.145 -1.751 *** 0.594
     No information -0.167 0.154 -0.730 0.602
Macro forecast performance
CPI inflation forecast -0.106 0.138 -0.953 0.602
Industrial production forecast -0.115 0.171 0.651 0.486
# of observations
McFadden's adj. R2
Cragg-Uhler (Nagelkerke) adj. R2











Notes:  The table shows the coefficients for the listed variables, interacted with the corresponding communication 
variable in each column from model (7), obtained from ordered probit estimates. See tables 7 and 8 for the definition of 
the non-interacted variables. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively. 
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